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ABSTRACT
In recent years the role of the Department of Motor Vehicles has
been transformed from issuing licenses to drive a motor vehicle to
issuing government-endorsed photo identification. A driver's
license is used not only by the state government, but also by the
federal government for boarding airplanes and the issuance of
passports. Passports are the defacto photo identification used by
foreign governments in the course of international travel.
Therefore, there are many security and privacy implications that
stem from the issuance of not just the state driver's license but also
the breeder documents (the identity documents that are used in
creating new identity documents) which are used in the granting of
the driver's license. Recently there have been new proposed
regulations that aim to increase the security of both the passport
and the driver's license. In this paper we discuss these proposed
changes, the potential privacy and security problems, as well as
policy conflicts between DMV regulations and applicable state and
federal laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identification has become a part of daily life for many U.S.
citizens. Since most Americans do not carry passports, the driver's
license is the most often used form of government-issued
identification. It is not just used as a license to drive, but as proof of
identity, proof of name, and even proof of residency. Given the many
uses for this document and the trust placed in it, it is no wonder that
government officials are trying to decrease its susceptibility to fraud as
well as make it more uniform across states.
As of 2001, the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics reported a
total of 191,275,719 individually licensed drivers in the United States;
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this corresponds to roughly 65% of the population.' Now that every
state issues its license with a photograph, the driver's license is
considered the de facto standard identification document within the
United States. This can be seen through many common transactions:
entering a bar or nightclub, withdrawing money from a bank, writing a
check, and even boarding an airplane. According to the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), all individuals wishing
to travel within the United States by 2 airplane must present
government-issued photo ID at the airport. Since fewer than ten
percent of U.S. citizens possess passports, 3 it is clear that the driver's
license is virtually required for air travel.
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that all
rights and privileges that are not regulated in the Constitution be left
up to the states. Since the privilege of driving does not explicitly have
interstate commerce implications and because there are no
constitutional guidelines, the licensing of drivers is left up to the states.
In all states, there are specific requirements for obtaining a license,
though they are largely similar for the purpose of comity. An
individual who has never held a license before in any state is required
to pass a written exam as well as a road test. All applicants are
required to pass a vision test (with or without glasses) and show proof
of identity. With the exception of Hawaii, all states require that
applicants jrove that they are a resident of the state to which they are
applying.
4
'4
1 United States Bureau of Transportation Statistics, "Table 4-2: Licensed Drivers: 2001,"
http://www.bts.gov/publications/statetransportationjprofiles/summary/htmU
table 04 02.html (accessed August 23, 2005).
2 U.S. Transportation Security Administration, "Travelers and Consumers: Air Travel,"
http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/editorial/editorial_1254.xml (accessed August 23, 2005).
3 Franz Wisner, "World Traveler: Five business lessons from the center of the real world," OC
Metro, http://www.ocmetro.com/archives/ocmetro_2002/metro62702/business062702.html
(accessed August 23, 2005).
4 Hawaii Motor Vehicle Safety Office, "Highway Safety Section: Obtaining a License," 2004,
http://www.hawaii.gov/dot/highways/hwy-v/hidlrqmt.pdf (hereinafter cited as Hawaii Motor
Vehicle Safety Office).
5 17 Hawaii Revised Statutes § 286-111 (2005), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/
Vol5Ch0261-0319/HRS0286/HRS 0286-0111 .htm (accessed August 23, 2005) (hereinafter
cited as The Hawaii Revised Statutes)-
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The abbreviation "DMV" stands for Department of Motor
Vehicles, and is used loosely in this paper to denote the state entity
that grants driver licenses. However, the organization of the DMV
significantly varies from state to state. In most states the DMV is a
division of the Department of Transportation. However, in many
states it is part of either the Department of Public Safety or the
Department of Revenue. Some states do not call it a DMV and some
make it a division of a different department or bureau altogether. In
every state, the basis for the DMV and its power must come about
through legislative action. Every state has statutes outlining the
function and powers of its DMV. In many cases, the DMV is given
the power to set its own policies either through the regulatory process
or by the discretion of the director. The director often determines what
information needs to be collected from an applicant for a driver's
license, though in some cases this is specified by statute or regulation.
Additionally, the director often decides how this information is kept
and to whom it can be released. The system of checks and balances
between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches keeps DMV
legislation under strict scrutiny. However, DMV practices set by the
director are often not held to this same scrutiny. We will show that
many DMV policies conflict with state statutes and regulations, and
also have varying privacy implications.
Under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, "the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states.",6 This means that if you get married in one state, your
marriage must be recognized in other states. Additionally, one would
assume that this means that identification cards and driver's licenses
issued by one state should be recognized as valid identification
documents in every other state. This process has been extended and
formalized by the creation of the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), through which DMV officials
from every state can meet in order to streamline interstate policies
(though the organization itself has no official power to set policy). 7
However, in the wake of September 11 h, states are rushing to
dramatically change their driver's licensing requirements, and thus
licensing policies differ drastically from state to state. '9 This paper
6 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2.
7 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, "About AAMVA," 2005,
http://www.aamva.org/about/.
8 Jennifer Wipf and Peter Wipf, "Now DMV is Turning Legal Immigrants Away," About.com,
January 15, 2002, http://www.immigration.about.com/library/weekly/aa0I1502a.htm.
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surveys all fifty states to draw similarities and differences among their
DMV licensing policies and to determine their basis in law and effect
on personal privacy.
In this paper we will examine the driver's licensing policies of all
fifty states. This includes analyzing the contents of the driver's license,
the legislative basis for granting the license, and the DMV policies that
govern the process. We will show that while many states have largely
similar requirements, some state DMVs have adopted policies that
differ from the state laws and regulations. At the same time states
have created many privacy and security problems. Finally, we will
examine recent federal legislation that is aimed at reforming the
licensing system. This legislation was passed in hopes of making the
process more secure as well as uniform across all of the states.
Unfortunately it does very little to address any of the security
problems and rather creates many new privacy problems. We believe
that the current administration's reliance on the Real ID Act to prevent
identity document fraud is akin to its suggestion of using duct tape to
stay safe during a biochemical or nuclear attack.
II. DMV POLICIES ON PERSONAL DATA
The state DMVs collect numerous types of personal data on their
customers. The increase in data collection draws concerns about who
has access to the information. Prior to ten years ago, it was common
practice for roughly two-thirds of the state DMVs to offer this
information to whomever asked for it. Some states charged a nominal
fee while others made names, birth dates, addresses, phone numbers,
license plate numbers, photographs, and Social Security Numbers
available for free. Some states also pro-actively sold this information
to private companies; New York made $17M in one year by selling
license information to marketing companies.
°10
'
1
On July 18, 1989, Robert Bardo, an obsessed fan, shot actress
Rebecca Schaeffer to death outside her apartment. He had found her
9 National Conference of State Legislatures, "State Driver's Licensing, State Identification
Cards and Fraud," June 2002, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/transportationlicensingfraud.htm
(accessed August 23, 2005).
10 Heather Hayes, "U.S. Supreme Court Takes up Driver's License Data Privacy," CNN.com,
May 21, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9905/2 l/license.priv.idg/.
11 Electronic Privacy Information Center, "The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and
the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle Record,"August 24, 2004,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (hereinafter cited as DPPA 2004).
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address after paying a detective agency $250. The agency simply went
to the California Department of Motor Vehicles and bought all of
Schaeffer's records, which were publicly available.' 2 This abuse of
publicly available information and other similar incidents were the
motivations for Congress to pass the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA; 18 U.S.C. §2721) in 1994. The DPPA makes it illegal for
state DMVs to release personal information without the requester
providing a valid reason. Valid reasons include debt collection,
insurance and safety purposes, product recalls, market research, and
when the requester has permission from the data subject. It should
also be noted that government a3encies and licensed private
investigators are exempt from the law. This means that had this law
been around prior to 1989, Bardo would have still been able to obtain
Rebecca Schaeffer's address because he used a licensed private
investigator. Additionally, the DPPA is often not enforced and in
some cases no burden of proof is required when a reason is given for
requesting driver records. For instance, in 2002, Allstate employees
were able to obtain records from the California DMV for personal use.
At the time, they had told DMV officials that they were exempt from
the DPPA because they fell under the "insurance and safety"
category. 
14
III. DRIVER LICENSING PRACTICES OF THE 50 STATES
For this study, data was aggregated from the fifty states on what
information is required by the DMV in order to grant a driver's
license. We took information solely from official web pages. Thus it
is possible that what is presented on the web page is different from
what the DMV asks for in person. Additionally, we also consulted
state statutes to determine the legal basis for the DMV policies. All
laws examined were current through 2003, as the 2004 legislative
session had not yet finished as of the original data gathering. Table 2
contains a summary of this data.
12 Katherine Ramsland, "It Takes A Star," Court TV's Crime Library, 2004,
http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminalmind/psychology/stalkers/l .html.
3 DPPA 2004, 10.
14 Deborah Lohse, "Illegal Snooping Costs Allstate Access to Online DMV Records,"
Mercury News, January 16, 2003,
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/4965810.htm (accessed January 2004; article
now removed).
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The table displays data on eight different metrics used for this
study. Almost every state classifies identification documents as being
either primary or secondary. Primary identification consists of a birth
certificate or passport in every state, but beyond that the requirements
are very nuanced, as will be discussed later. Secondary identification
usually consists of government issued documentation that is not
normally used for identification purposes: marriage certificates, social
security cards, INS documents, and even school records. In the key
for the table, a "P" proceeded by a number indicates a quantity of
primary identification documents, and an "S" proceeded by a number
indicates a quantity of secondary identification documents. In some
cases, multiple secondary documents can be substituted for a primary
document; this is denoted by a "/" separating two different
requirements. In all cases, if information about requirements could not
be located, "N/A" is displayed in the table.
The first metric displayed in the table is the legal requirements for
obtaining a driver's license. This amounts to whether a state statute
outlines what identification is required, and if so, what that
information is. The aforementioned syntax is used in most cases. In
some cases though, the law delegates authority to the director of the
DMV. In the table, "DD" indicates that the law allows the director to
determine all identification requirements. In a few select cases, the
law stipulates that the applicant need only sign a sworn affidavit that
the information he has provided is correct. An "A" indicates these
cases.
The next two columns in the table indicate what the DMV policy is
in regard to identification. This information was taken from either the
official DMV web site, or from DMV regulations. Column two
outlines the requirements for an individual who has never held a
driver's license, and the third column outlines the requirements for a
new resident to the state who wishes to transfer an out-of-state license.
In many cases these requirements are the same, with any discrepancies
usually based on whether the previous driver's license is accepted by
the DMV as valid identification. The fourth column indicates this.
This field shows whether the previous license is accepted, and if it is,
whether it counts as a primary or secondary form of identification.
The fifth column indicates whether a state requires an individual to
present "proof of Social Security Number" at the time of licensing.
This amounts to either the original Social Security card or an official
letter from the Social Security Administration. The sixth column
indicates whether a state requires applicants to be fingerprinted. The
last two columns show whether a signature appears on the license and
whether the license is electronically readable. This last column also
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shows what format is used for making it electronically readable (either
a barcode, magnetic strip, or both).
Table 1: Key for Driver Licensing Practices of the 50 States Table
Abbreviation Description
A Sworn Affidavit
DD DMV Discretion
N/A Not Applicable / No Information Found
0 Other
P Primary Identification
S Secondary Identification
BC Bar Code
MS Magnetic Stripe
Table 2: Driver Licensing Practices of the 50 States
41 e,-,,© .o=
40.~ 44.1
IP 
--
1DD S17 1P is Y No Yes MS
15 Alabama Department of Public Safety, "Applying for an Alabama Driver License or Non-
Driver Identification Card," 2004,
http ://www.dps. state .al .us/publie/driverlicense/pd f/Appl yingDL .pdf.
16 Code of Alabama § 32-6-4 (2001), http://alisdb.legislam.state.al.us/acas/ACASLogin.asp
(accessed August 23, 2005).
17 Two secondary forms of identification if photograph is not present.
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C'.
1PC
C 4
A 218'22  DD l1 2 IP is P S 2  No No Yes 1MS
1P BC
AR 2 '  DD 1S17  P P No No Yes. MS
Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles, "Drivers License, Permit and State ID information,"
2004, http//www.state.ak.us/local/akpages/ADMIN/dmv/akol/index.htmn.
'9 Alaska Statutes § 28.15.061 (2004), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/
cgi-bir/folioisa.dll/stattx4/query=*/doc/%/7Bt 12171%/7D?.
20 One document must show date of birth.
2 1 Arizona Department of Transportation, "Driver License: Frequently Asked Questions,"
2004, http://www.dot.state.az.us/mvd/faqs/scripts/faqs.asp~section--dI (accessed August 23,
2005).
22 Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-3158 (2004),
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FonnatDocument.asp?inDoc--i/
ars/28/03158.htmn&Title=28&DocType=ARS (accessed August 23, 2005).
23 Only license from a select list of states qualify as primary identification.
24 Office of Driver Services, "Driver License Overview," Arkansas Department of Finance and
Administration, http://www.arkansas.gov/dfa/driver-services/ds-license.htmi.
25 Arkansas State Code tit. 27 (2004),
http'.//1 70.94.58.9/NXT/gteway.dll?f--templates& fn=de fault.htin&vid=blr:code.
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eBC
C12
Ix
BC
CO28 ,2 9  DD 2P 2P P No Yes Yes MS
CT3° '3 1 DD IP is 1P IS S No No Yes BC
26 California Department of Motor Vehicles, "Driver License and Identification (ID) Card
Information," 2004, http://www.dmv.ca.gov/dl/di-info.htm.L
21 California Vehicle Code § 12800-12819 (2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
cgi-bin/displaycode?section--veh&group = 12001-13000&file= 12800-12819.
28 Colorado Division of Motor Vehicles, "Colorado Driver Licenses: Answers to Frequently
Asked Questions," State of Colorado Department of Revenue, 2004,
http://www.revenue.state.co.us/mvdir/wrap.asp?incl--faqdrli.
'9 Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-2-107 (2004),
http://198.187.128.12/colordo/lpext.dll/Infobase4/6208 f/62277/62279/622d4/
62372?f-hitlist&q--42-2-107&x=Advanced&opt--&skc=-8000000300062373&c =-
curr&gh--1 &2.0#LPHit 1.
30 Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, "Acceptable Forms of Identification," 2003,
http://www.ct.gov/dmv/cwp/view.asp?a-=805 &q=244772.
31 14 General Statutes of Connecticut § 246-14-36 (2004),
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dipubs/pub/htm/CHAP246.HTM#Scc 14-36.htm.
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D6E 3 ' 33  DD 314  1P IS 1P IS p No No Yes BC
BC
FL 3 5,36  DD IP IS 1P IS p/S 2 3  No Yes Yes -MS
GA 37 ,38 DD IP 1P is S No Yes Yes BCHI39 4° DD E 4 P P No Yes Yes BC
32 Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles, "Driver Services," 2004,
http://www.dmv.de.gov/services/driver services/driverslicense/drlicgenreq.shtml.
33 21 Delaware Code chap. 27 (2004), http://www.delcode.state.de.us/title2l/c027/index.htm
(accessed August 23, 2005).
34 Birth certificate or "other evidence satisfactory to the Division."
35 Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, "Obtaining Your Florida
Driver License or Identification Card," 2004, http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/ddl/faqkeys.html.
36 23 Florida Statutes § 322.08 (2004),
http://www.fisenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfin?Appmode=DisplayStatute&Search-String=
&URL=Ch0322/SECO8.HTM&Title=>3E2003>3ECh0322>3ESection%2008#0322.08.
37 Georgia Department of Driver Services, "Identification Requirements," 2005,
http://www.dds.ga.gov/drivers/DLdata.aspx?con=l 741541737&ty=dl.
31 Georgia Code § 40-5-25 (2004),
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/gl codes-detail.pi?code=40-5-25.
3 9 Hawaii Motor Vehicle Safety Office, 4.
40 The Hawaii Revised Statutes, 5.
41 Proof of age and identity. Proof of residency is not required.
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42 Idaho Division of Motor Vehicles, "Idaho Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards: Fact
Sheet," 2004, http://itd.idaho.gov/dmv/DriverServices/driver-licensefacts.htm.
41 Idaho Statutes § 49-3-306 (2004),
http://www3.state.id.us/cgi-bin/newidst?sctid=490030006.K.
44 Cyber Drive Illinois, "Rules of the Road," 2004,
http://www.sos.state.il.us/publications/rr/rr-chapO .html.
4' 625 Illinois Compiled Statutes § 5-6 (2004),
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=062500050HCh%2E+6&ActID=
1815&ChapAct=625%26nbsp%3BILCS%26nbsp%3B5%2F&ChapterlD=49&ChapterName=
VEHICLES&SectionID=2851 I&SeqStart=-72290&SeqEnd=92890&ActName=Illinois+
Vehicle+Code%2E.
46 Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, "Driver License: Identification Requirements," 2004,
http://www.in.gov/bmv/driverlicense/idreq.html (accessed August 24, 2005).
47 Indiana Code § 9-24-3 (1991), http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title9/ar24/ch3.html
(accessed August 24, 2005).
48 Iowa Department of Transportation. 'Proof of Identity for an Iowa Driver's License or ID,"
2004, http://www.dot.state.ia.us/mvd/ods/identity.htm.
49 7 Iowa Code § 321.182 (2004),
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/IACODE/2003SUPPLEMENT/321/182.htnl.
Cl.
UO
hi 0
ID 424 DD -Pi Pi N o YsB
DD 1P I- P e N esB
iN4647 A1P s IPis SYesNo Ys B
,I, A, F4,4 BC
DD IP is Ii o o YsM
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e.
C6C
2P25
ad a
~~BC
KS 50'51 DD I is IP 1s P No No Yes MS
KY'25 DD ____ -F3- No Yes No Yes BC
2P /
LA55 56  DD IP is iP iS 'S Yes No Yes MS
_____8 DD 05__ Ip p No No Ys B
50 Kansas Department of Revenue. "Driver's License Information Proof of Identity," 2004,
http://www.ksrevenue.org/dmvproof.htm.
5' Kansas Statutes § 8-240 (2003), http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-binlstatutes/index.cgi.
52 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, Division of Driver Licensing, "Obtaining a Kentucky
Driver License/ID Card and General Information," 2004,
http://transportation.ky.gov/drlic/general.htm.
53 16 Kentucky Revised Statutes § 186.412 (2004), http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/KRS/
186-00/412.PDF.
54 Birth certificates are the only accepted primary identification.
5' Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles, "Drivers License & Identification Card Information,"
Louisiana Department of Public Safety, 2005, http://www.dps.state.la.us/omv/license.html.
56 32 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 403 (2004),
http'//www.legis.state.la.us/ss/Iss.asp?doc=88374.
57 Maine Bureau of Motor Vehicles, '"Obtaining a Driver's License," Department of the
Secretary of State, 2004, http://www.state.me.us/soslbmv/licenses/getlicense.html.
58 Maine Revised Statutes, tit. 29-A, chap. 11, § 1301 (1993),
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/statutes/29-A/title29-Asec 1301 .html.
5 Any official document sufficiently proving age.
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60 Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration, "Sources of Proof," 2004,
http://www.marylandmva.com/DriverServ/Apply/proof.htm.
61 Maryland Statutes § 16-106 (2004), http://mlis.state.md.us/cgi-win/webstatutes.exe.
62 Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, "Identification Requirements and Acceptable
Documents," 2004, http://www.mass.gov/rmv/license/3id.htm.
63 14 General Laws of Massachusetts § 90-8 (2004), http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/
90-8.htm.
64 Michigan Department of State, "Driver License & State ID," 2004,
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0, 1607,7-127-1627_ 8669-,00.htm1.
65 Michigan Vehicle Code § 257.307 (2004),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/mileg.asp?page=getObject&objName=mcl-257-307.
66 Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Driver and Vehicle Services, "Identification and
Residency Requirements," 2004,
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/dvs/AD/20Requirments/IDfiameset.htm.
6 7 Minnesota Statutes § 171.06 (2004), http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/l71/06.html.
aZ.
e-..
co CP0 O a .5d
UU
4) t~ Iwo Ap .
92 2w 500,% o
I BC
M6,6I DD IP2IS 2PS P N/A No Yes MS
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68 Mississippi Highway Patrol Driver Services, "Regular Class R Driver License," Mississippi
Department of Public Safety, 2004, http://www.dps.state.ms.us/dps/dps.nsf/divpages/
hp2ds-info-classR?OpenDocument.
69 Mississippi Code § 63-1-19 (2004),
http://198.187.128.12/mississippi/lpext.dll?f-templates&fii=fs-main.htm&2.0.
7 0 Missouri Department of Revenue, "Driver Licensing Checklist," 2004,
http://www.dor.mo.gov/mvdl/driver/checklist.htm.
" 19 Missouri Revised Statutes § 302.171 (2004), http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/
c300-399/3020000171 .htm.
72 Montana Department of Justice, "Driver Licensing," 2004,
http://www.doj.state.mt.us/driving/driverlicensing.asp.
73 Montana Code Annotated § 61-5-107 (2005), http://data.opi.state.mt.us/bills/mca/61/5/
61-5-107.htm.
74 Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles, "Identification Requirements," 2004,
http://www.dmv.state.ne.us/examining/idlist.html.
5 Nebraska Statutes § 60-484 (2004),
http://statutes.unicam.state.ne.us/Corpus/statutes/chap60/R6004084.html.
76 Law stipulates standard primary identification documents or anything else that the director
approves.
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7778  P1P- 1P o e.N esB
d .0 T
6 6 -
NH9 8  DD 10P1S 1 N o N Ye M-n z 0 co C;'( 6
N77,78 P LP IP No *Yes No Yes BC
_ 2P __ _ _ _ BC
N79,8O DD 15s8l 2P 1S81 No No No Yes MS
NJ 2'3  DD PS PS PS Yes No Yes BC
NM 4,85  N/A IP IP P Yes No Yes MS
77 Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles, "Nevada Driver Licensing," 2004,
http://www.dmvnv.com/nvdl.htm.
78 43 Nevada Revised Statutes § 483.290 (2004), http://leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-483.html.
79 New Hampshire Department of Safety, "Bureau of Driver Licensing Frequently Asked
Questions," 2004, http://nh.gov/safety/dmv/driverlic/faq.html.
0 21 New Hampshire Statutes § 263:5 (1982),
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/XXI/263/263-5.htm.
81 Birth certificate must be provided along with one other primary identification and another
proof of residency.
82 New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, "Licenses," 2004,
http://www.nj.gov/mvc/citlicenses/d_licenses.html.
83 New Jersey Permanent Statutes § 39:3-10 (2004), http://lis.njleg.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/
om isapi.dll?clientlD=127459717&Depth=4&TD=WRAP&advquery=%22icensing/*20Of/*
2odrivers%3b%2oclassifications%22&headingswithhits=on&infobase=statutes.nfo&rank =
&record= {DA5A} &softpage=DOCFramePg42&wordsaroundhits=-2&x=O&y-0&zz=.
84 New Mexico Motor Vehicle Division, "Driver License Manual," 2004,
http://www.state.nm.us/tax/pubs/dlm/dlm.htm.
85 New Mexico Statutes § 66-5-9 (2004),
http://www.conwaygreene.com/nmsu/lpext.dll/Infobase4/992/1c2ca/Ic8f5/lc 8f8/lc 952?f =
templates&fn=document-frame.htm&2.0#JD_66-5-9JD_66-5-9.
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S,27.h DD P P No No No Yes BCDD *P i  No o No YesBC
OH 9 3 ,4 'N/A iP is aniP is p Yes No Yes MS
9 N York State Department of Motor Vehicles, "General Information About Driver
Licenses," 2004, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/license.htm.
89New York Vehicle & Traffic Code § 502 (2004),
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUJERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUJERYDATA=
$$VAT502$$@TXVAT0502+&LIST=LAW+&BROWSER=28865828+&TOKEN=
53980568+&TARGET=VIEW.
88 North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, "Applying for a Driver's License or Learner's
Permits?," 2004, http://www.ndot.org/dmv/driverservices/drivingpublic/applying.htnl.
9 North Carolina General Statutes § 20-7 (2004),
http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTMlBySection/Chapter_20/
GS_20-7.html.
90 Statute calls for any two forms of identification approved by the director.
91 North Dakota Department of Transportation. "Drivers License and Traffic Safety," 2004.
http://www.state.nd.us/dot/dlinfo.htmnl.
92 North Dakota Century Code § 39-06 (2004), http://www.state.nd.us/lr/cencodet39c06.pdf.
93 Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, "Acceptable Identification Documents," 2004,
http://www.bniv.ohio.gov/aid_2.htm.
94 45 Ohio Revised Code § 4507.06 (2004),
http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/o/IpExt.dIUIPORC/lf~c8/lfc66/lfc9c?.
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95 Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, "Drivers License FAQ," 2004,
http://www.dps.state.ok.us/dls/dlfaq.htm.
96 47 Oklahoma Statutes § 6-1-6(A) (2004),
http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/OKStatutes/CompleteTitles/os47.rtf.
97 Law requires one primary and one secondary identification document; DMV is left to
determine what counts as primary and secondary identification.
98 Oregon Department of Motor Vehicles, "Proofs of Age, Identity and Address," 2004,
http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/DMV/driverid/idproof.shtml.
99 59 Oregon Revised Statutes § 807.400 (2004), http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/807.html.
10o Pennsylvania Driver & Vehicle Services, "Documentation Needed for Proof of Identity and
Residency," 2004, http://www.dmv.state.pa.us/licensingmaster/identity.shtml (hereinafter
cited as Pennsylvania Driver & Vehicle Services).
101 67 Pennsylvania Code § 73.3 (2004), http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/067/
chapter73/s73.3.html (hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Code).
102 DMV policy does not recognize an out-of-state license as valid primary identification,
while the state regulation does.
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103 State of Rhode Island Division of Motor Vehicles, "Licenses & IDs," 2004,
http://www.dmv.ri.gov/licenses/.
104 State of Rhode Island General Laws § 31-10-12 (2004),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE31/31-10/31 -10-12.HTM.
105 South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles Online, "Accepted Forms of Identification,"
2004, http://www.scdmvonline.com/DLidentity.aspx.
'
0 6 South Carolina Code of Laws § 56-1-90 (2004),
http://www.scstatehouse.net/codet56c001.htm.
107 Law stipulates proof of name and proof of date and place of birth.
'0' South Dakota Department of Public Safety, "South Dakota Driver Licensing Program,"
2004, http://www.state.sd.us/dps/dl/sdlinfo/sdlmain.asp.
109 South Dakota Statutes § 32-12-3.1 (2003), http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/
index.aspx?FuseAction= DisplayStatute&Type=Statute&Statute--32-12-3. 1.
110 Birth certificate, passport or any other reasonable document.
111 Birth certificate and one additional secondary document.
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2 Tennessee Department of Safety, "Do You Have the Right Documents," 2004,
http://www.tennessee.gov/safety/requireddocsign.pdf.
... Tennessee Code § 55-50-321 (2004), http://198.187.128.12/tennessee/lpext.dl/Infobase/
2e6e1/303d2/304af/30522?fn=document-frame.htm&f-=templates.
114 Texas Department of Public Safety, "Driver License and ID General Information," 2004,
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/administmtion/driverlicensingcontrol/
dlgeneralinformation.htm.
15 7 Texas Statutes § 521.142 (2004), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/docs/TN/
content/htm/tn.007.00.000521.00.htm#521.142.00.
116 Utah Department of Public Safety, "Driver License Division Frequently Asked Questions,"
2004, http://driverlicense.utah.gov/faqs.html.
' Utah Code § 53-3-205 (2004), http://www.le.state.ut.us/code/TITLE53/htm/53_03014.htm.
"s Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles, "Proof of Identity Required," 2004,
http://www.dmv.state.vt.us/LICENSES/PROOFOFIDREQUIRED.htm
". 23 Vermont Statutes § 631 (2004), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/
fullsection.cfm.iTitle=23&Chapter=009&Section=0063 1.
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120 Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, "Acceptable Documents for Obtaining a Driver's
License of Photo Identification Card," 2005,http://www.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/Pdf/dmv 14 .pdf.
"2' Code of Virginia § 46.2-323 (2003), http://legI.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+46.2-323.
122 Washington Department of Licensing, "Identification Requirements," 2005,
http://www.dol.wa.gov/ds/id.htm.
12' Revised Code of Washington § 46.20.035 (2004),
http://www.leg.wa.gov/RCW/index.cfmn?section=46.20.035&fuseaction=section.
124 Any U.S. state or federal government issued photo-identification that also contains a
signature.
125 State law says previous license counts as sufficient identification but DMV policy says it
does not.
126 West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, "Driver's License Information," 2004,
http://www.wvdot.com/6_motorists/dmv/6glIa-licensein fo.htm.
127 West Virginia Code § 1713-2-7 (2004), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/WVCODE/
17B/WVC%/2017%/20B-%/20%/202%/20%/20-%/20%/20%/207%/20%/20.htra#HD0.
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128 Wisonin Department of Transportation, "DrivetabLice ID uentii a on," 2005,
http://wdote.wiscosinfa.ov/sdriersdrvr/pyd ocid.hm
"3' Wyoming Statutes § 31-7-111 (2004),
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/statutes/titles/title3 1/chapter07.htin.
13 A birth certificate is required for first time applicants while a previous license is required
for everyone else.
13 Birth certificate plus previous license.
134 A new license only needs a birth certificate whereas a transfer requires both a birth
certificate and the previous license.
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sufficient to obtain a driver's license. Twenty-one other states require
one primary and one secondary form of identification. In all but seven
states, a birth certificate plus secondary identification can be used to
identify one's self when applying for an initial driver's license. This is
a major security flaw as a birth certificate does not contain a
photograph and can be obtained by anyone over the Internet. For
instance, the VitalChek service allows anyone to obtain a birth
certificate from 39t states without showing any identification. All that
is required is knowledge of the name on the birth certificate, the names
of the mother and father, and the location and date of birth. Of the
other 11 states, most require a facsimile of a driver's license as proof
of identity in order to obtain a birth certificate by mail. Many of the
states will also require a signature upon delivery of the birth certificate
(obviously they cannot compare it to any signature on the birth
certificate). 135 Thus, it is trivial to obtain a valid driver's license in
many states under someone else's name solely because of the trust that
is incorrectly placed in birth certificates. This same trust is placed in
the issuance of passports in the United States. To obtain a passport for
the first time, all that is needed is a birth certificate and government-
issued photo ID (such as a driver's license). 136  Thus, as with the
driver's license, the root document in obtaining a passport is the birth
certificate. These relationships can be seen in figure 1.
t Upon trying to order from their website, we were prompted to either fax a copy of a driver's
license or passport, or order the birth certificate directly from the state.
131 VitalChek Networks, Inc., "Order Your Official Certificate Now!," 2005,
http://www.vitalchek.com/.
136 U.S. Department of State, "How to Apply in Person for a U.S. Passport," 2004,
http://travel.state.gov/passport/getfirstapply.html.
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Figure 1: Identity Document Requirement Relationships
States making it easy to obtain a driver's license under false
pretenses are not the only problem. Nine states have conflicts between
their state laws and their DMV policies which make it harder for
individuals to obtain a legitimate driver's license. Often this problem
arises from having a lenient statute compounded with the DMV
requiring more documentation than what is legally required. This
specific case occurs in Pennsylvania. Section 73.3 of the Pennsylvania
Code outlines a list of documents that are sufficient to prove one's
identity when getting a PA license. The list that the DMV accepts is a
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subset of this list; most notably, the DMV does not accept an out of
state license, while the regulation specifically does.1
37 138
Under the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1997,
every state is required to collect Social Security Numbers during the
driver licensing process. These numbers are collected in databases by
the states and shared with the federal government. Under the law,
every state is required to use a central system to verify every number
with the Social Security Administration. From a telephone call with
an AAMVA representative, it appears as though 44 states currently do
this verification online, though under legislation to be discussed in the
next section online verification will be required. This just means that
the name, number, and birth date are both entered so that it can be
determined whether the number is valid, and whether it was issued to
the name and birth date listed on the license application. 139 However,
as the table indicates, 21 states require the applicant to bring in
physical proof of their Social Security Number. The card itself has no
security features. Nor does the card say anything about the person
presenting it; it contains a name and a number. While this makes it
fairly trivial to forge a card, acquiring a legitimate one in another name
is also trivial. The Social Security Administration requires
identification to replace a lost card. Their mistake is that they do not
restrict this to government-issued identification. They will happily
accept an employee identification card or a student I.D. card.14
0
One can clearly see that because of the identification dependencies
and requirement relationships that surround most of the U.S.
government-issued I.D., it is possible to obtain identification in
someone else's name with just knowledge of that person and a forged
privately-issued identification card. But, knowledge of the person
might also be unnecessary; various online services allow a purchaser
to enter a last name and receive a list of birth records, death records,
Social Security numbers, property records, and even census data on all
matches with similar last names. 4 1 Thus, for $100 and a last name, it
117 Pennsylvania Driver & Vehicle Services, 100.
' Pennsylvania Code, 101.
139 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, "Social Security Number
Verification Best Practices," 2003,
http://www.aamva.org/Documents/idsIDSecurityFrameworkAppendices 106303.pdf.
140 U.S. Social Security Administration, "Your Social Security Number And Card," 2005,
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10002.html#proving.
141 MyFamily.com Inc., Ancestry.com, 2005, http://www.ancestry.com/.
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is possible to find all of the information necessary to obtain a birth
certificate. Once this is accomplished, an individual can create a
fictitious corporation which will grant an employee identification card
in the name of the forged identity. This can be used to obtain an
official Social Security card. With these two items, an individual can
get a valid driver's license in another person's name in the majority of
the states. With the driver's license and the birth certificate, a valid
U.S. passport can be obtained.
V. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In late 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform Act (P.L.
108-458). In addition to reforming intelligence, it set new federal
standards for identification documents. Among those specifically
mentioned are driver's licenses. Since the federal government cannot
force the states to abide by such standards, the law mandates that
driver's licenses will not be accepted by federal agencies unless the
states conform. This essentially means that older non-conforming
licenses can still be used within states for the purpose of driving, but
travel by airplane (or entrance to federal courts, travel by train,
obtaining a passport, etc.) will not be allowed since the TSA (or any
other federal entity) will not recognize such licenses as valid
identification. Additionally, states are given another incentive to
comply in the form of federal grants. In terms of what the law actually
mandates, there are no specifics. Instead it stipulates that within nine
months of its passing a committee is to adopt guidelines for the data
that is to appear on the licenses. This includes name, photo, birth date,
security features, a unique identification number, and a machine-
readable technology. The committee is to consist of any interested
parties, which includes both federal government agencies as well as
privacy and civil liberties groups.
However, on January 26th of 2005, the Real I.D. Act (H.R. 418)
was introduced in the House of Representatives. It was eventually
amended to a "must-pass" defense spending bill, passing in the House
and unanimously passing in the Senate with no debate. It was signed
into law (as P.L. 109-13) on May 1 h, causing the driver licensing
provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act to be repealed. In addition
to granting the Department of Homeland Security even more
ambiguously far-reaching powers, the legislation also aims to
standardize driver licensing across all of the states. The law sets
specific minimum requirements for the content of a license: each
license must contain a full name, date of birth, gender, a unique
identification number, a photograph, signature, physical security
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features (often a hologram), and a machine-readable technology (such
as a bar code or magnetic stripe, though no specific technologies are
mentioned in the law). 142 While this looks substantially similar to the
driver licensing provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act (which have
been repealed under the Real ID Act), it differs on stating specifics.
However, from our data, it appears that all fifty states have already
implemented the guidelines for driver's license content. Every state
requires that a reproduction of a signature appear on the front of the
license, as well as that the license be machine-readable and contains a
security feature. Some licenses contain a magnetic stripe, while others
contain either a one-dimensional or a two-dimensional barcode.
Currently, forty states have implemented two-dimensional
barcodes on licenses. This technology has been protected by a patent
since 1993, which is assigned to Symbol Technologies. 143 However,
since it is also an ISO standard now, the company is forced to license
the technology free of charge. The adoption of this technology by
state DMVs has allowed them to go from storing around 100
characters on a one-dimensional barcode or a magnetic stripe, to
storing around 2,000 characters using a two-dimensional barcode. This
allows them to store all of the information that appears on the face of a
driver's license on the back in this machine-readable format. The
AAMVA has been touting this new technology for detecting
counterfeit licenses; both airport security personnel and bouncers can
scan cards using handheld equipment to verify that the information
that appears on the front is the same information that appears in the
barcode. 144 However, what they fail to advertise is that since this is an
open standard, instructions on how to both decode and encode these
barcodes are publicly available. Indeed, searching online for
counterfeit driver's licenses yields sites that advertise the inclusion of
these new barcodes complete with authentic information. So in the
end, licenses with this technology are no less susceptible to
counterfeiting than their previous counterparts.
Another major difference between the Real ID Act and the
licensing provisions of the Intelligence Reform Act is that the Real ID
142 The REAL ID Act of 2005, P.L. 109-13, Division B (hereinafter cited as The Real ID Act).
143 Wang, Ynjiun P. 1993. System for encoding and decoding data in machine readable
graphic form. U.S. Patent 5,243,655, filed Mar. 16, 1992, and issued Sept. 7, 1993,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com:9003/5243655.pdf.
'44 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), "Personal
Identification - AAMVA International Specification - DIJD Card Design," 2005,
http://www.aamva.org/documents/std2005dl-idcardspecv2final.pdf.
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Act aims to setup a national database. In addition to drivers in all fifty
states having their information stored here, the database will also be
shared with Canada and Mexico. Since all of the new licenses will
have the same information on them, which is then stored in one
national database, this basically creates a national ID card. In reality,
the only difference between licenses will be the background picture.
Creating a de facto national ID creates many new privacy implications
yet does little to increase security. It is unclear what additional
information will be stored in this database; the law mandates that all
breeder documents be digitally stored for no less than ten years. While
this helps to create a paper trail, it will also be a boon for identity theft.
Finally, the Real ID Act also sets up standards for the issuance of
the license. In addition to requiring proof of a social security number
(or lack thereof, e.g., a letter from the Social Security Administration
saying that the applicant is ineligible) and proof of address, the act also
requires "a photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity
document is acceptable if it includes both the person's full legal name
and date of birth." Thus, to prove identity, any document containing a
full name and birth date will be accepted, regardless of who issued the
document and whether it contains a photo or not. This provision was
clearly put in place to allow birth certificates to be used, since the birth
certificate is the most widely used breeder document. However, this is
a major security flaw: there are no federal standards governing how
states construct birth certificates, and thus each one may contain
different information as well as different (or no) security features. But
at the same time, the Real ID Act mandates that "the State shall verify,
with the issuing agency, the issuance, validity, and completeness of
each document required to be presented by the person. There are
essentially three types of verification:
1. Verifying that the document contains accurate information.
2. Verifying that the document is a certified original and not a
forgery.
3. Verifying that the document describes the person who is
presenting it.
This law only specifies the first type of verification. For instance,
a DMV employee might call up the issuer of a birth certificate to
confirm that the copy he is looking at has correct information printed
on it (or, more accurately, information that matches the official
141 The REAL ID Act, 142.
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records). This only proves that such a person described by the
document exists. This says nothing about whether this copy of the
birth certificate is genuine, nor does it say whether the person applying
for the license is really the person he claims to be. As mentioned
earlier, obtaining a birth certificate is trivially easy; there can be no
way of verifying that the person demanding the birth certificate is the
same person whose name is featured on it since it does not contain any
photographic information (even if it did, there would be no way of
correlating the baby picture with the adult). At the same time,
obtaining someone else's birth certificate is usually just a matter of
knowing his name, birth date, and any other publicly available
information that the locality might require. Indeed a recent report by
the National Research Council found that "many of the foundational
identification documents used to establish individual user identity are
very poor from a security perspective, often as a result of having been
generated by a diverse set of issuers that may lack an ongoing interest
in ensuring the documents' validity and reliability. Birth certificates
are especially poor as base identity documents, because they cannot be
readily tied to an individual."'' 46 Thus, making the birth certificate the
main identity document when issuing both drivers licenses and
passports is a major security failure. This problem can only be
addressed by the introduction of a strong biometric identifier on the
birth certificate itself. This biometric must remain constant throughout
the subject's lifetime. In short, a DNA fingerprint is the only identifier
that could solve this problem.
Currently DNA tests take several hours to multiple days to
complete and typically cost over a hundred dollars per test. This could
mean that states could end up spending billions of dollars with little
increase in document security; if the test takes multiple days, there is
nothing to prevent one person from providing DNA and then having a
different person show up to collect the completed document. These
barriers would need to be addressed before widespread adoption could
be considered. The creation of an identifier that is linked to DNA also
creates problems of its own. If such a system were to be implemented
today, it would only reasonably identify those who were born after the
system's inception. Those who are already born would need to
retroactively get identified before their DNA could go on record.
There would need to be a very secure identification process in place
before this could happen since if an individual fraudulently gets his
DNA linked to the wrong identity, a very strong false sense of trust
146 Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett, Who Goes There? National Academy of Sciences,
2003. http://books.nap.edu/htmi/whogoes/.
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will be placed on this new identity indefinitely. Thus such a system
can only reasonably be trusted for individuals born after its inception.
But even in these cases the degree of linkage can never be perfect.
This system would not be in place in every country, thus immigrants
would have a better chance of assuming a false identity if they are not
strongly linked with an identity document from birth. As of the 2000
U.S. Census, 11.1% of the population was born in a foreign country. 47
Additionally, not every child is born in a hospital where a DNA
sample can be taken and certified immediately after birth. For
instance, in 2002, 1% of all newborns in the U.S. were delivered
outside of hospitals. While one percent is a small number, this
corresponds to over 40,000 people that year alone. 41 Thus, if DNA
fingerprints were to be placed on birth certificates or other identity
documents, such a system would need at least twenty years to begin to
function properly and would likely miss more than one tenth of the
population.
The final problem with using DNA is that as our medical
understanding increases, implications with regard to medical privacy
also increase. The privacy concerns regarding sharing a large database
containing DNA information are enormous. For instance, while the
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552) regulates access to personal
medical records, there are exemptions for law enforcement. Imagine
in ten years if we could determine someone's predisposition for
becoming a sociopath based on DNA. Surely this database would
undergo function creep to aid law enforcement in monitoring potential
criminals. These concerns have played out in countless science fiction
plots. For example, the movie "Gattaca" provides one view of DNA
testing taken to an extreme. While such stories are fictitious, the
issues they raise are worthy of consideration.
VI. PRIVACY CONCERNS
While it is clear that the Real ID Act at best does nothing to
improve the security of identity documents and at worst makes such
documents less secure, it also creates many new privacy concerns.
Long-term theoretical privacy implications aside, there are many
147 United States Census Bureau, "Nativity, Citizenship, Year of Entry, and Region of Birth:
2000," 2005, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?-geo id=O1000US&-qrname=
DEC_2000_SF3_UQTP14&-dsname=DEC_2000_SF3_U.
148 Centers for Disease Control, "National Vital Statistics Reports," December 17, 2003,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr5210.pdf.
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current privacy implications with regard to the Real ID Act. As
discussed in Section 1, the driver's license is used for many non-
governmental purposes. If this is to continue, non-government entities
(private corporations) will require access to this database in order to
verify licenses. This creates many problems, as it is difficult to ensure
that these companies will use the information only for identity
verification. There is also the question of how the government will be
using the information and what additional information it will contain.
For instance, if you swipe your ID to board a plane, will an entry be
created in the database denoting your travel itinerary? Will private
companies have access to additional information? Many point out that
most European Union countries already have mandatory national
identity cards, so this would be no different. However, there is a
difference in that most EU countries have strong data privacy laws;
government and corporations cannot share personal data without
explicit consent. It should also be noted that these countries do not use
linked databases to the extent that the U.S. does. Finally, the security
of such a database must be called into question. While maintaining a
database of this magnitude containing accurate information is a task
unto itself, ensuring that it is secure against attackers will be another
major problem. Such a database will need to be accessible to many
different parties, yet at the same time it must be protected from insider
attacks as well as viruses, worms, and outside human attackers.1
49
Although not mandated by the Real ID Act, seven states currently
collect fingerprints when issuing driver's licenses. 15 ° While the
secondary uses of this data are largely unknown, California claims that
the reason for acquiring fingerprints is to curb identity theft.
Analyzing fingerprints at the time of license application can help
guarantee that the applicant has only one license issued under one
name. However, government collection of fingerprints is beginning to
go well beyond the issuance of driver's licenses. There are claims that
retaining fingerprints can help locate missing children. The National
Child Identification Program is a joint venture between the FBI and
149 Bruce Schneier, "A National ID Card Wouldn't Make Us Safer," Minneapolis Star
Tribune, April 1, 2004, http://www.schneier.com/essay-034.html; American Civil Liberties
Union, "5 Problems with National ID Cards," September 8, 2003,
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfin?ID=13501&c=39; Adam Thierer, "National ID
Cards: New Technologies, Same Bad Idea," CATO Institute, September 28, 2001,
http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/010928-tk.html.
1s0 Reed F. Morris, James B. Reed, and Melissa Savage, "State Driver's Licensing: Security
Concerns," National Conference of State Legislatures, 2002,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2002/issues/driverslicense.htm.
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the American Football Coaches Association.' 51 The NCIP distributes
fingerprinting kits at football games in hopes that parents will
fingerprint their children and put the prints on file. These fingerprints
are stored in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC),1 2 which
is a database maintained by the FBI. This database is undergoing
function creep - it was originally created to house information on
criminal records. Ostensibly, it is in the federal government's interest
to coordinate these programs with state DMVs so that soon every state
will require fingerprinting of applicants. Creating a uniform
framework for collecting this information from all of the states is only
the first step.'
53
Previously, most states required a warrant to gather fingerprints. If
fingerprints were found at a crime scene and the authorities had a
suspect in mind, a judge had to sign an order before the authorities
could force the suspect to be fingerprinted (in an attempt to match the
crime scene fingerprints). 154 The basis in law for this was that law
enforcement officials could not touch an individual without a court
order or consent as otherwise it could amount to assault or an
unreasonable search. While it is possible for police to follow a suspect
and wait for him to touch something, this practice usually only occurs
when police have a particular suspect in mind. In fact, California
made fingerprinting at the DMV optional from 1977 to 1982. However
in 1982 fingerprinting became mandatory. Anecdotally, there are
stories that applicants who declined to be fingerprinted were often
subjected to having their fingerprints dusted from their application
forms. 155 Whether or not these stories are true, the policy was not
changed because DMV officials were violating the law but rather
because the stories created a perceived image of dishonesty.
151 National Child Identification Program, "How Fingerprints can Help Find a Missing Child,"
2004, http://www.childidprogram.com/05fingerprint.html.
152 Federation of American Scientists, "National Crime Information Center (NCIC)," 2003,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm.
153 Electronic Privacy Information Center, "Your Papers, Please: From the State Drivers
License to a National Identification System," February 2002,
http://www.epic.org/reports/yourpapersplease.pdf.
154 Ronald Bailey, "DNA Nation: It's a CSI world now," reasononline, November 22, 2004,
http://www.reason.com/links/links I 12204.shtml.
155 Declan McCullagh, "Which states currently fingerprint drivers (Georgia already does),"
Insecure.org, November 20, 2002, http://seclists.org/lists/politech/2002/Nov/0064.html.
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The Driver's Privacy Protection Act allows any DMV records to
be accessible for law enforcement. Thus, states that require
fingerprinting for driver's license applications no longer need to obtain
warrants to gather fingerprints from the 65% percent of the adult
population whose fingerprints are already in the DMV database. If the
fingerprints cannot be found there, the authorities can now try
searching NCIC, just in case the suspect was fingerprinted as a child(or if he was previously arrested). By allowing DMVs to retain
fingerprints, law enforcement officials no longer need a particular
suspect; any fingerprints found at a crime scene can be matched
against the database as part of a fishing expedition to find a suspect.
There is little difference between this practice and requiring DNA
samples from all members of a particular demographic.156
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The creation of a perfect identification system is a completely
infeasible task. The resulting document would first need to be
resistant to forgery. The best way of accomplishing this is through the
use of cryptographic signatures. However, such signatures would need
to be able to be readily verified by anyone examining the document.
This would amount to every state opting in to a nationwide Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) so that verifiers can locate the digital key and
determine whether or not it has been compromised. 157- The use of
cryptography can also ensure that the document contains the same
information that the issuing entity has on file, however it cannot
guarantee that it describes the bearer. As mentioned earlier, this can
only be accomplished by the use of a strong biometric that does not
change over time, such as DNA. But mandatory DNA fingerprinting
creates more problems than it solves. In short, to create a perfect
identity document system, states would need a drastic increase in
funding, and insight into properly setting up and maintaining a
nationwide PKI and DNA database. Such a system would also put the
U.S. at risk of turning into a police state.
Even if a perfect identity document system were in place, we
would still be subjected to the same security problems. The current
motivation for reforming the driver's license is to aid government in
156 American Civil Liberties Union, "ACLU of Virginia Asks Charlottesville Police to Halt
DNA Collection from African-American Males," April 12, 2004,
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cffm?ID=15466&c=l 29.
117 Wikipedia, "Public Key Infrastructure," 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKI.
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identifying suspected terrorists. But in reality, if the government were
to correctly know everyone's name when boarding a plane, it would
still know almost nothing about an individual's intent. Of the nineteen
September 1 Ith hijackers, only two were on terrorist watchlists.'5
Identity information must be linked to detailed reputation information
before an identity system can be useful for stopping terrorists or other
criminals.
Because of the cost, privacy and security risks, and the futility of
creating a new national identity system, it is our opinion that
government resources can be better spent in other ways. First and
foremost, border security needs to be increased in this country to keep
foreign threats just that-foreign. This can be accomplished by
improving intelligence-gathering techniques as well as coordinating
sharing of intelligence between agencies and learning how to extract
useful information out of the vast intelligence already collected.
Sharing existing intelligence and records between law enforcement
agencies will also address domestic threats. Finally, if enough funding
remains to improve airport security, it should be spent on real security
measures and not identification. Efforts should be focused on
improving airport screening procedures and training new personnel. If
airport screeners are able to determine that no one boarding a plane
poses a danger to others, why does knowing the names of the
passengers matter?
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Roughly ten years ago, the process of obtaining a driver's license
was relatively straightforward. If no prior license was held, the
individual would show a birth certificate or passport, pass the
applicable knowledge and vision tests, and be granted a license. If the
individual was moving to a new state, all that was required in most
states was a vision test and surrender of the previous driver's license.
Only nineteen states still allow this practice, and soon none will allow
it under the new federal legislation. With recent fears over terrorism
and identity theft, states are trying to be pro-active about strengthening
identification requirements.
Additional identification documents are now required in many
states. In many cases these policies are set by the DMV and not by the
state legislature, and thus often conflict with state laws. In other cases,
158 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, "The 9/11
Commission Report," August 21, 2004, http://www.9-1 Icommission.gov/report/
911 ReportExec.htm.
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regulations created by the DMV are different from what the DMV
does in practice. Requiring additional identification is not necessarily
the solution to the problem especially when it is just as easy to
fraudulently acquire identification documents.
Some of the pushes for increased security with regard to
identification come from the federal government. We are moving
towards a national identification card that is uniform across all the
states, similar to identification cards in other countries. Congress and
the Department of Homeland Security have stated that they will not
explicitly mandate a national card. So instead the government is trying
to do the next best thing- control how states issue driver's licenses so
that these can be turned into a de facto national ID. Since 65% of the
U.S. population has a driver's license, controlling this process will
eliminate the need to reissue cards if we were to move towards a single
federally-mandated card.
The new driver's license requirements have many implications for
personal privacy. Fingerprinting is required in 14% of the states
currently, but the Department of Justice is pushing to see all of the
states implement it. Since obtaining fingerprints are normally covered
under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement usually needs a court
order to require an individual to submit to fingerprinting. In any case,
a suspect exists by the time law enforcement tries to match latent
fingerprints. But if fingerprints are on file with the DMV and freely
accessible to law enforcement, they can go on a fishing expedition,
similar to compelling fingerprints from the entire population. Thus,
one right to privacy will no longer exist; you will no longer have a say
in how your personal information is stored, accessed, or shared.
While the Department of Justice is trying to take steps to make
personal information readily accessible, some members of Congress
seem to genuinely want to protect personal information. The Driver's
Privacy Protection Act attempted to limit access to personal
information to those who legitimately have a need for it.
Unfortunately, the law has many loopholes and does little to protect
what it was originally intended to protect. Since these problems stem
from the DMV retaining the information in the first place, it would
seem that there would only be one solution: require the DMV to only
retain data that is absolutely necessary. The driver's license is no
longer just a license to drive - it is both a state and national
identification card. By allowing it to undergo function creep, privacy
problems have abounded. This first happened when the driver's
license turned into a license to purchase alcohol and will continue as it
is further transformed into a more general-purpose license. Similarly,
many of the government's attempts at strengthening these
identification systems are coming under the guise of national security.
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It is unclear if this is also a situation of function creep or of simple
ignorance.
National security is about protecting the country from outsider
attacks, yet efforts to regulate driver's licensing only impact those who
are already within the country. Furthermore, since none of the efforts
to increase the security of these documents address the security of the
breeder documents, fraudulent identification documents will continue
to be granted regardless of increased security measures. But at the
same time, creating a new identity document that is strongly linked to
an individual from birth will create new privacy and security problems
of its own. There is no such thing as a perfect identity document
system, and until government officials realize this, we will continue to
see an erosion of personal privacy. 0 brave new world, that has such
people in it!

